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Sweet Development
The sugar beet industry, agricultural societies and agrarian
transformations in the Russian empire 1818‑1913
Un développement doux : l’industrie de la betterave sucrière, les sociétés
agricoles et les transformations agraires dans l’Empire russe, 1818-1913
Susan Smith‑Peter
1 Russian agricultural societies were voluntary associations that linked governmental and
private actors with the hopes of transforming Russia’s environment and economy. This
article  explores  how  one  agricultural  society—the  Moscow  Agricultural  Society,
established in 1818—encouraged the cultivation of sugar beet in European Russia as a
substitute  for  cane  sugar.  While  the  government  was  not  sympathetic,  it  indirectly
assisted the sugar beet industry through its policies on taxes and tariffs. Even before the
abolition of serfdom in 1861, the society had successes in spreading the cultivation of
sugar  beets  and  encouraging  the  production  of  beet  sugar,  which  required  complex
machinery.  Entrepreneurial  nobles  were  able  to  change  their  agricultural  practices
without state assistance, relying mainly on free labor and on motivating serfs to plant
sugar beets by paying money. Such nobles were scattered throughout the Russian Empire,
and the Moscow Society played a key role in assisting them with seeds and improved
technology. 
2 At the same time, the Moscow Society was not able to transform the environment in the
way they had originally hoped, which was to change European Russia by encouraging
small noble producers to shift to growing sugar beet, which would then be processed in
the factories of wealthy nobles. Instead, what began to emerge even before 1861 was the
rise of extremely large vertically integrated producers in central and southern Ukraine,
which is  particularly  rich in  the  soil  best  suited for  growing sugar  beets.  While  the
patchwork of small and large producers in European Russia needed the tutelage of the
Moscow Society  to  establish  the  industry,  the  massive  Ukrainian producers  required
neither  packets  of  seeds  nor  training  for  their  stewards  in the  basics  of  beet  sugar
production.  This  article  argues  that  although  the  work  of  the  Moscow  Society  was
important for introducing the cultivation of sugar beet, ultimately the superior soil found
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in the central and southern Ukrainian provinces, along with the spread of free labor and
advanced technology there, allowed for the emergence of a highly successful beet sugar
industry that was different from what the Moscow Society had originally envisioned. 
3 This article contributes to three major areas of study: Ukrainian and Russian economic
history,  and the  activities  of  voluntary  associations.  Ukrainian economic  history  has
attracted  scholars  for  many  years,  and  classic  works  imply  that  Ukraine’s  economic
growth gave it a possible basis for autonomy.1 However, the main focus of Ukrainian
history traditionally was to trace the growth of the Ukrainian idea via its ideological
bearers and the conflicts they encountered with the Imperial Russian state. The populist
thrust of classic historical narratives made it difficult to integrate the growth of factories,
which Populists saw as exploitative, into a narrative of an emerging nation.2 Newer work
deals  with the interaction of  various  ethnic  groups in regions of  Russia.3 Comparing
Ukrainian and Russian economic development before 1861 helps to explain one aspect of
Ukraine’s divergence from Russia. 
4 The history of the rise of market agriculture in Russia has long occupied historians, as it
is one part of the long‑running debate about capitalism in pre‑revolutionary Russia.4 In
the 1960s, economic historians focused on the role of the state in accelerating a shift from
subsistence to market agriculture;  in particular,  Alexander Gerschenkron argued that
Russian agriculture contributed to Russian backwardness due to low yields resulting from
serfdom and the peasant  commune and that  the state had to  drive  industrialization
forward as a result.5 More recently, Carol S. Leonard has argued that the state failed to
implement agrarian reform due to the lack of instruments at its disposal, particularly at
the local level.6 In the 1970s and 1980s, historians brought the Gershenkron model into
question by arguing that development happened even under serfdom and that the state
was not the only source of economic development; they also noted the importance of
foreign investment in the late Imperial period and the influence of enterprising nobles
before 1861.7 Newer works also critique the state‑led argument,  and take part  in an
intellectual  turn  in  Russian  economic  history,  shifting  from  a  heavily  quantitative
discipline to one interested in changing ideas about the economy, generally focusing on
the most important figures in this process.8 This article focuses on both broader social
groups  and  on  individuals  to  introduce  a  new collective  actor  in  the  economic  and
intellectual history of Russia: the agricultural societies. 
5 Scholars working on agricultural societies have given widely varying evaluations of how
much impact they had on agricultural practice. The first works were the jubilee histories
written  by  leaders  of  societies  themselves;  not  surprisingly,  they  emphasized  their
important achievements.9 In his classic works, Michael Confino noted that agricultural
societies  worked  with  the  state  to  attempt  to  change  agricultural  practice,  but  he
questioned whether they had any real impact.10 However, because Confino focused on
changes to the three‑field system in central Russia, developments in Ukraine and in beet
sugar production were outside the scope of his work.  Sugar beets could be grown in
peasant vegetable plots without changing the three‑field system, but nevertheless were
part of improved agriculture. David Moon has noted that agricultural improvements were
most common in southern Russia and Ukraine.11 Tracy Dennison argues that we know
little of  pre‑1861 agricultural  practice and that attention to the local  and regional  is
needed in order to build our knowledge.12 Newer works on agricultural societies argue
that they did influence agricultural science and practice, both before and after 1861.13
After  1861,  there  was  a  shift  from  a  limited  number  of  noble‑dominated  voluntary
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associations to a more broad based series of societies and cooperatives.14 By taking sugar
beet production as a case study, this article helps to give a more nuanced understanding
of how even when some societies were initially successful at spreading new crops and
technologies, the small‑scale agrarian industrialization they hoped for in central Russia
was supplanted by massive factories in Ukraine. 
6 Even smaller scale producers had to deal with a process that required some knowledge
and complex machinery,  as first the beets would be grated and boiled,  and the juice
pressed from them. This juice would then be purified by saltpeter or other chemical
means and then evaporated. The resulting syrup would be boiled until it crystalized, a
process that required a refinery, meaning that smaller producers often had to sell syrup
rather  than  crystalized  sugar  if  there  was  no  refinery  nearby.  When the  first  large
refinery appeared in Kiev in 1843, rather than in Moscow, it was an early sign of the shift
in the center of the industry.15
 
The State and the Russian sugar beet industry : the
politics of taxes and tariffs
7 Sugar was not only a consumer good but also a matter of state. In Russia, levies of various
sorts on sugar were a major source of the state’s income, and there were debates about
which levies on which type of sugar would bring in the optimum income for the state.
Sugar is produced both from sugar beets and from cane. Due to the influence of the
refiners of raw sugar in St. Petersburg, for much of the nineteenth century, refined cane
sugar could not legally be imported into Russia, aside from Odessa and a few other Black
Sea  ports.  Raw  cane  sugar  was  imported  to  St. Petersburg,  where  sugar  refineries
produced the finished product. Sugar beets could be grown over a large swathe of the
central and southern parts of the Russian Empire, although they also required a refinery
to produce refined sugar. 
8 The state had to raise money through tariffs and taxes without driving sugar prices so
high that smuggling or reduced consumption would decrease the government’s income
from  such  levies.  It  also  had  to  navigate  between  the  pressures  applied  by  the
St. Petersburg cane refiners and the emerging sugar beet industry. This section seeks to
tease out the main turning points and influences in the development of the sugar beet
industry in the first half of the nineteenth century. Between 1800, when the sugar beet
industry was in its infancy, and 1848, when the first excise was placed on beet sugar, the
state was most interested in raising money through levies on cane sugar while placating
the St. Petersburg refiners, but they also inadvertently stimulated the growth of the sugar
beet industry. 
9 Sugar  cane  produces  a  large  amount  of  sugar  from  each  plant,  and  during  the
colonization of the New World, European countries introduced a colonial system in which
imported African slaves worked on sugar cane plantations, in the harshest of conditions,
and the sugar was often sold exclusively to the colonizing country or to other countries
without tropical colonies at high prices.16 Although experiments with extracting sugar
from beets had begun as early as the seventeenth century, it was Franz Carl Achard who,
in 1799 in Austria, perfected the process, winning praise from Napoleon, who predicted
Britain would have to throw its sugar into the Thames, as the Continent’s sugar would
now come from beets.17 
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10 Both Napoleon and Alexander I stimulated the development of the production of beet
sugar.  Napoleon put  the  resources  of  the  state  behind the  promotion of  beet  sugar,
creating six experimental  sugar beet  stations and assigning one hundred students to
them. He spent lavishly on supporting the cultivation of sugar beet and by 1812‑1813, 309
of the 334 sugar factories in Continental Europe were in France.18 During the Napoleonic
Wars, prices for cane sugar in Russia and elsewhere reached unprecedented heights due
to the Continental System, which Napoleon instituted between 1806 and 1814 in order to
prevent much of continental  Europe from trading with the United Kingdom, a major
supplier of cane sugar. In 1800, Emperor Alexander I approved measures to give free land
to  those  who  would  grow  sugar  beets,  to  reward  those  who  established  beet  sugar
factories and successfully grew sugar beets.19 Sometime between 1800 and 1802, a sugar
factory was established on an estate in Tula became the first widely known sugar factory
and  spurred  nobles  in  central  Russia  to  imitations.20 By  1810,  there  were  four  such
factories in Russia, and by 1812 there were 10.21 
11 Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, which began on June 24, 1812, increased sugar prices to
new highs and spurred interest  in producing beet  sugar.  Not surprisingly,  there was
interest in how to make beet sugar during this period; in 1812, a newspaper in Kazan
provided information on how to make beet sugar crystallize faster.22 With the resumption
of French trade with Britain in 1814 came the collapse of the sugar beet industry in
France, which did not recover until the 1840s.23 However, in Russia, sugar beets continued
to be widely grown, to the point that the St. Petersburg refiners began to criticize the new
industry.24 
12 In  1822,  the  government  levied  a  high  tariff  on  raw  cane  sugar  that  amounted  to
15 percent of its value, and forbade refined cane sugar to be imported into Russia.25 The
effect was protectionist for beet sugar, even if the intent of the government was to raise
money. At the same time, prices for grain in domestic and European markets were so low
that growers were not able to cover their costs.26 In 1822, a protectionist tariff on grain
expired, driving its price still lower.27 There was a harvest failure in 1822 that was due to
a changing climate.28 As a result, Russian landowners engaged in the market were looking
for a crop that could offset the losses they were incurring.
13 The new tariff proved to be a turning point. In 1822, there were only two sugar beet
factories that made up to 1 500 poods of granulated sugar.29 One of them was the factory
of I.A. Mal´tsov, who was the key figure in the spread of the beet sugar industry in this
era.  Working  with  the  Moscow  Agricultural  Society,  Mal´tsov  indefatigably  spread
information about the technical and agricultural aspects of beet sugar production, as will
be discussed below. In 1825, there were eight beet sugar factories; by 1832, twenty had
appeared.30
14 In 1832, despite complaints of the St. Petersburg refiners that domestic beet sugar was
competing with cane, Minister of Finances Egor Frantsevich Kankrin raised the tariff on
cane sugar from 2 rubles 50 kopecks a pood to 3 rubles 15 kopecks, which was 34 percent
of its value.31 This very high tariff further stimulated the beet sugar industry by inflating
the price of sugar. More nobles became interested in growing sugar beets, and in 1834, a
group of  beet  sugar  producers  founded the  Committee  of  Sugar  Beet  Manufacturers
within the Moscow Agricultural Society.32 By the late 1830s, sugar beet production had
begun to spread to left bank Ukraine.33 By 1840, the number of beet sugar factories in the
Russian Empire had jumped to 140.34
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15 The state did not intend to encourage the production of beet sugar. Due to the serious
famine of 1833, the government focused on the need for subsistence items, and sugar was
not needed for survival.35 Minister of Finances Kankrin was suspicious of the growth of
the sugar beet industry and noted in 1833: “The beet‑sugar industry is one of the most
illfounded projects of the Russian gentryman.”36 Nicholas I was also personally hostile to
the cultivation of the sugar beet, believing it would damage the soil.37 The government
did not prevent landlords from engaging in the sugar beet business, but they refused to
make loans to nobles on sugar, even though they did so on nearly all other agricultural
products.38 However, it is possible that Kankrin’s comment, which came a year after he
levied such a high tariff on cane sugar, was a sort of demonstrative grumbling to placate
the refiners.39 
16 In 1841,  the government raised the tariff  again,  to 3 rubles 80 kopecks a pood.40 This
extremely high levy started to impact the amount of revenue collected as people limited
their consumption. Customs revenues from sugar were 3.7 million rubles in 1831, and
rose to 8 million in 1844 due to the high tariff, but fell to less than 5.5 million rubles in
1847 due to people reducing their consumption of sugar.41 The refiners were in a position
to complain more effectively  as  the  state  felt  the  impact  in  its  pocket.  In  1847,  the
secretary of the Moscow Agricultural Society, Stepan Alekseevich Maslov heatedly denied
that the 1841 tariff  had stimulated the development of  the industry,  saying that  the
extremely  low  prices  for  grain  were  the  real  force  behind  the  industry’s  spread.42
However, the intensity of the denial could not hide the connection between the tariff and
the growth of the industry.43 The number of sugar factories jumped from 140 in 1840 to
350 in 1848, the largest increase of any eight‑year period between 1810 and 1914.44
17 With the arrival of a new Minister of Finances, Fedor Pavlovich Vronchenko, the refiners
found a more sympathetic ear. They complained that hurricanes in Cuba had hurt the
crop there and that they needed the state to allow them to import raw and half‑refined
sugar from England, a concession that cost the state 579,000 silver rubles in 1845. The
same “hurricane” took place in 1846 and 1847.  The refiners  also demanded that  the
government levy an excise on beet sugar.45
18 During this time,  there were rumors of  such an excise,  and the Moscow Agricultural
Society mobilized opinion against it publicly and privately. It is particularly interesting to
analyze a letter, dated January 31, 1845, from Maslov to Petr Ivanovich Keppen, who was
named head of the third division of the Ministry of State Domains in 1838 and was a
member of  the Scholarly Committee of  that ministry in 1841.46 The two had been in
correspondence  since  at  least  1839,  and  this  is  reflected  in  the  informal  nature  of
Maslov’s style, which includes a frank discussion of the possibility of an excise on sugar
beet: 
To hit factory owners with a tax now would be simply stupid and harmful; give the
industry some time to take root and only then go ahead and place a high levy on
lump sugar, like tobacco and cigars; an excise will allow consumers to buy sugar 49
1/4 percent cheaper and the flow of producers out of the industry would kill it.47 
19 Maslov then ended by saying that his speech on the progress of the sugar beet industry
recently appeared in Moskovskie Vedomosti and asked if Keppen would be interested in
“helping with publicity” by coauthoring articles with Maslov. 
20 In  his  articles  for  the  Moskovskie  gorodskie  listki  in  1847,  Maslov  continued  his
propaganda  campaign  on  behalf  of  the  Committee  of  Sugar  Beet  Manufacturers,
appealing to nationalism by saying that beet sugar could replace foreign cane sugar, to
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fears  of  change  by  saying  it  kept  peasants  in  the  villages  and  avoided  creating
proletarians, who had made life so difficult for English, French and German ministers,
and to humanitarian feelings by saying that cane sugar was stained with the blood of
slaves in Cuba and elsewhere.48 Interestingly, in a series of articles critiquing Maslov’s
work, several authors argued that bringing down the price of sugar was more important
than protecting the infant beet sugar industry, suggesting that Maslov’s fear of lower
prices, expressed only in private to Keppen, could be detected by his critics.49
21 In the end,  the excise on beet sugar was approved on February 25,  1848.50 However,
Minister of State Domains Pavel Dmitrievich Kiselev interceded on behalf of the Moscow
Agricultural Society to ensure that the norms set for the extraction of sugar from the
beets were low. This meant that factories had a strong motivation to increase the amount
of sugar they extracted from the beets, as the more they could exact, the less excise they
paid in real terms.51 In practice, the excise hastened the shift from smaller, less efficient
factories to large, advanced ones, particularly in Ukraine.
22 The shift of the center of the beet sugar industry to Ukraine meant the rise of large
factories  using  advanced  equipment  and  free  labor.  This  laid  the  foundation  for  a
competitive  beet  sugar  industry  in  the  Russian  Empire.  By  the  second  half  of  the
nineteenth century, sugar beets were widely grown in Europe and government policies,
such  as  bounties  that  encouraged  the  import  of  sugar  abroad,  had  led  to  an
overproduction of sugar and a corresponding slump in prices on the world market, which
fell by nearly half between 1856 and 1912.52 Even so, the Russian Empire continued to be a
major producer of  beet  sugar, becoming the fourth‑largest  producer in Europe,  after
Germany, Austria‑Hungary and France in 1890 and the second largest, after Germany, in
1917.53 
 
The Moscow Agricultural Society and the origins of
market agriculture in Russia
23 The  Moscow  Agricultural  Society  (MAS)  played  a  key  role  in  introducing  market
agriculture into the Russian Empire. Through their publications, they spread knowledge
about cash crops to landowners both large and small.  They served as nurse to infant
industries  like sugar  beets.  The MAS was part  of  a European‑wide social  network of
scholars,  landlords,  and  government  officials  interested  in  encouraging  agricultural
production. During the eighteenth century, much of Europe experienced rising prices
along with rising population and urbanization.  At  the same time,  the Enlightenment
provided new scientific studies of agriculture that promised an increase in production
sufficient to feed the cities. Governments in central and Eastern Europe, including those
in  the  German lands,  the  Hapsburg  Empire  and the  Russian  Empire  encouraged  the
application  of  these  new  methods.54 In  particular,  market  agriculture  increased
productivity by introducing fodder crops such as clover and new root vegetables such as
the turnip and the rutabaga, which were capable of feeding more livestock and more
people.  The  fallow land  was  planted  with  fodder  crops  for  livestock,  which  in  turn
provided a greater amount of fertilizer so that the land could be used more intensively.55
24 Russian  agricultural  societies  were  established  at  around the  same time  as  those  in
Europe  and  America.  The  first  agricultural  society  in  the  world  was  the  Society  of
Improvers in the Knowledge of Agriculture, founded in Scotland in 1723, but inactive
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after 1741. Established in 1731, the Dublin Society is the oldest such society that survives
today, while the Royal Agricultural Society of England was established in 1838. In 1761,
France established a royal society of agriculture.56 Just four years later, Catherine the
Great established the Free Economic Society to improve Russian agriculture and industry
by spreading new ideas and techniques; it drew upon the example of recently founded
European voluntary societies to do so. The first American agricultural society was the
Society for Promoting Agriculture, established in 1785. The 1850s and 1860s was a boom
time in the creation of such societies in the West; at just that time they were most active
in Russia as well. In the United States, there were nearly 2 000 agricultural societies with
roughly 400,000 members, or one in ten farmers.57 During the mid‑nineteenth century,
science had become more useful for farmers and was not yet the province of universities
and  governmental  bodies.58 While  agricultural  societies  in  the  pre‑reform  era  were
mainly the province of nobles and focused on education, by the late nineteenth century,
many were credit associations that lent to peasants and other agriculturalists.59
25 The members of the MAS tended to be large landowners. One count of the 770 members
that joined between 1818 and 1860 found that 621 of them, or 81 percent, had more than
100 male serfs, which was considered the minimum needed to allow a fully Westernized
existence,  while  211,  or  27 percent,  owned more  than 500,  putting  them among the
wealthiest nobles.60 During its first few decades, its members believed technology could
fix the problems of  serf  agriculture;  when this hope was dashed by the 1840s,  many
became  abolitionists.  During  the  1840s,  nobles  were  also  influenced  by  a  Romantic
reevaluation  of  the  peasantry  as  the  bearer  of  Russian  nationality  rather  than  the
Enlightenment image of them as obstacles to scientific agriculture.61 Before 1861, the MAS
focused on nobles; afterwards, it spread agricultural information among the peasants.
One of its successful programs in reaching the peasants was assisting with the creation of
rural credit cooperatives; between 1865 and 1899, 568 cooperatives were established and
by 1916 there were more than 5 000.62 The famed agrarian economist Alexander Chayanov
came out of the MAS tradition, as he noted himself.63
26 The MAS worked closely with the government, but was still driven by its own interests. In
1836, many MAS administrators became government employees in that the government
paid  their  salaries.64 This  was  in  response  to  MAS  vice‑president  Sergei  Ivanovich
Gagarin’s  request  that  the  society’s  secretary,  the  director  of  the  Society  for  Sheep
Breeding, their assistants, and the senior and junior clerks become civil servants.65 These
positions were administrative, not executive. The president, vice‑president and council
seats all  remained independent of  the government.  Wealthy nobles filled these more
powerful  positions  and  did  not  require  government  compensation.  The  government
created almost a shadow ministry in the MAS to deal with landlord serfs at the same time
a new ministry was created to deal with state peasants; in 1837, Nicholas I approved the
creation of  the Ministry of  State Domains (MGI),  headed by Count Pavel  Dmitrievich
Kiselev, who conducted a major administrative reform of state peasants.66 
27 However, this did not mean that the society lost all initiative. The government collected
information  from  the  society  but  did  not  give  it  orders.  As  MAS  Secretary  Stepan
Alekseevich  Maslov  wrote,  “the  government  stated  its  willingness  to  protect  the
Agricultural  Societies,  as  the  closest  intermediaries  between  the  landlords  and  the
agriculturalists entrusted to their guardianship.”67 In 1838, Kiselev wrote to Golitsyn to
inform him of the new order, noting that the establishment of the ministry included the
right “to direct societies,  serving for the dissemination of agricultural information.”68
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Kiselev asked only for annual published reports from the MAS, information on successful
agricultural experiments, and “proposals the Society has for the future dissemination of
useful innovations.”69 
28 The result was more a coordination of work than a control of it.  In an 1858 letter to
enlightened bureaucrat Andrei Parfent´evich Zablotskii‑Desiatovskii,  Maslov recalled a
conversation he had had with Kiselev on the relationship of the ministry with the society.
Maslov wrote that he had told Kiselev, 
Preserve  the  society;  in  Russia  it  is  easier  to  establish  two ministries  than one
society. Why is this? Because in a ministry for each vacancy you will find up to two
candidates searching for a job, but the society consists of free people, not bound by
anything. Here moral strength is necessary so that the society can hold on and be
active,  especially  among  ourselves,  who  have  not  grown  to  fit  the  demands  of
societies. The count agreed.70 
29 Despite the generally cordial relations between the government and the MAS, the society
continued to promote sugar beet production in the face of government disinterest and
hostility. The MAS was more than just a handmaiden of the state. 
30 In 1822, at the moment when grain had hardly any value and enterprising landlords were
seeking a cash crop, the Moscow Agricultural Society played a key role in convincing
many that sugar beets were what they were looking for. In particular, Malt´sov, one of the
pioneers  of  the  industry,  published  an  article  stating  that  sugar  beets  were  highly
profitable.71 In fact, the budget published in the 1822 article showed that, after expenses,
Malt´sov had made 9 670 rubles in pure profit.72 According to Mal´tsov, beets took only a
day to plant and required little extra care. Peasant women could grow them in their
vegetable plots. In addition, they were harvested after the main harvest, which was a
relatively  slack  time.  The  byproducts  of  sugar  beet  refining  could  be  used  to  feed
livestock and would increase milk production, the article stated.73 In other words, it was
possible  to  start  sugar  beet  production  without  serious  reorganization  of  peasant
agricultural practice—a major advantage for landlords both small and large.
31 The Moscow Agricultural Society encouraged nobles with fewer than 100 serfs, who made
up the majority of the noble estate but who sometimes lived in a modest way not unlike
their own serfs,  to grow sugar beets and process them in small  factories in order to
expand the base of raw materials and encourage the consumption of sugar.74 Malt´sov’s
article did reach such small‑scale but enterprising nobles, as we see in a detailed account
from one Baron Kots, who had a small estate with only 84 peasants. In a letter to the
Moscow Agricultural Society in 1833, he described how, after he retired from the military,
he sought some cash crop that would make a profit on his small estate, as grain alone had
little value and could be grown in quantities that just barely kept himself and his serfs
from starvation. In reading the Society’s journal, he came across Mal´tsov’s article and
decided to try his hands at growing sugar beets. The Society provided him with crucial
technical help, as he did not have enough serfs to qualify for state loans, which were not
given for sugar beet in any case. Kots took time to prepare for the beet sugar factory,
sending one of his serfs as an apprentice to Malt´sov’s factory in 1825, from whence he
returned in 1827 with a certificate.  In 1828,  Kots was then able to build a successful
factory and to encourage his serfs to grow sugar beets in their vegetable plots by giving a
very high cash advance to one peasant, who spread the word all around the village. Once
many peasants and some nobles began to provide him with beets, Kots then decreased the
price he paid for beets.75 Kots is an excellent example of the small landlord who would not
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have been able to establish a sugar mill without the assistance of the Moscow Society’s
publications and members. 
32 Owners of larger sugar mills also were influenced by Malt´sov to establish their own
factories. This included Aleksei Nikolaevich Bakhmetev, who was the owner of a large,
technically advanced factory in Penza province,  located in southern Russia,  just  over
300 miles to the southeast  of  Tula,  the original  heartland of  sugar beet  production.76
Bakhmetev was an general from the infantry, a participant in the battle of Borodino, and
served  as  the  Governor‑General  of  Nizhnii  Novgorod,  Kazan,  Simbirsk  and  Penza
provinces, as well as in the State Council.77 Penza province was in a favorable location for
trade  at  the  border  of  the  steppe  and  forest  zones,  and  had  a  tradition  of  market
agriculture.78 This sugar beet factory was part of Bakhmetev’s estate in Petrovka village,
which also had a weaving factory, a hospital and school, along with crystal and glass
factories  nearby.79 Bakhmetev  was  an  enterprising  landlord  with  enough  capital  to
undertake major improvements and to produce for the market. In this, he was a model
member of the MAS, which he joined in 1836.80 He was among the middling and larger
landlords who dominated the Committee of Sugar Beet Manufacturers.81 
33 The Moscow Society held up Bakhmetev’s factory as a model. At a May 19, 1832 meeting
of the Moscow Society, the problems of the industry were discussed, including a lack of
capital  to  buy steam‑driven equipment  and a  difficulty  in producing white  granules,
which were a medium‑stage product. Only Bakhmetev had been able to produce white
granules, the Society noted.82 In 1835, Bakhmetev’s factory was one of only two sugar
mills in the empire that used steam‑driven machines.83
34 Letters  from  Bakhmetev’s  factory  manager,  Porfirii  Riabinin,  to  Bakhmetev  have
survived, providing us with a rich source on the day‑to‑day workings of a beet sugar
factory and the difficulties in establishing consistent quality control. However, despite
these problems, the level of control over the product was enough that sale of the product
did not suffer. Between 1837 and 1844, Riabinin wrote several times to report on progress
or lack thereof. These letters suggest that only landlords with a high capitalization could
afford to spend the money necessary to outfit the factories and cover the inevitable lulls
in production. In addition, they show that processing sugar beet would be much easier in
warmer regions. On August 23, 1838, Riabinin wrote that the factory was almost ready,
with 23 workers already there and 58 more to come.84 Unfortunately, he did not mention
if they were hired or serf labor. However, at least some of the more skilled overseer
positions would have been hired, even if the rest were serfs. The condition of the workers
at times concerned Riabinin. He wrote on December 6, 1839 that the boys in the factory
“are not now zealous [because they have] no shirts and high boots.  Would it  not be
possible to order that these be sent to the factory office?”85 The boys were not the only
ones to suffer the cold. Some of the beets froze, which meant that it was difficult to
produce the right sort of syrup. Riabinin was able to boil it to the required thickness
without it undergoing unwanted fermentation, but only when he was personally present.
In addition, the workers had a tendency to mix watery or fermented raw juice with good
quality runs, jeopardizing the final product.86 But the problems with the winter did not
stop there. On December 4, 1840, Riabinin wrote with bad news. The pond had frozen
solid and all work had ceased. “The water is all gone and the machine stopped working on
November 30th,” he noted.87 In order to begin the first step of boiling the grated beets,
water was necessary. Without it, the beets had backed up and 459 bushels’ worth were
waiting to be processed.88 Riabinin hoped they would not freeze, and stated somewhat
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plaintively that “the work had been going well from the cellar and the juice was very
good, as were the sugar lumps.”89 
35 After the beets had been boiled, the resulting juice was purified by chemical means. The
Bakhmetev factory used saltpeter, which is also used in gunpowder and for pickling meat.
However,  Riabinin  stated  that  the  juice  was  of  poor  quality  and  required  a  high
percentage of saltpeter, and “I am afraid that after refining the saltpeter might remain in
the  granules.”90 In  addition,  when the  quality  of  the  beets  and juice  was  bad,  more
saltpeter was needed, which drove up production costs. 
36 The use of complex machinery did not solve all problems. Riabinin complained several
times of the lack of cleanliness at the factory, and particularly of the lax overseers who
did not ensure that the machines were frequently cleaned. This was a problem, given the
sticky  nature  of  sugar  making.  Sometimes  the  machinery  would  break  down or  the
resulting product would suddenly begin to vary, as in one case where a batch ended as
“crystallized caramel” rather than as lump sugar.91 Even with the new machines, Riabinin
noted the need for more forms for crystallizing the sugar, which would have required an
extra  expense  for  Bakhmetev;  another  time,  Riabinin  asked  for  more  paper.92 Thus,
although sugar refining was profitable, it was not easy for poorer nobles to take part. Any
advanced equipment required access to capital, which was difficult for the reasons Baron
Kots laid out. Here, the willingness of the MAS to spread what technical information they
could was very important in decreasing the costs of entry, but over time even the Society
could not help the smaller factory owners with all their needs. 
37 The Moscow Agricultural  Society played a key role in the early spread of  beet sugar
technology  through  its  publications,  which  opened  up  networks  of  assistance  to
noblemen who owned few serfs, as well as wealthy ones. Malt´sov was the most important
individual to encourage the spread of this branch of industry, both through his articles,
which gave detailed plans of technology and budgets, and through his willingness to take
on apprentices so that other landlords could train their own serfs to be directors of their
beet  sugar  mills.  In  the  1830s  and  1840s,  the  Moscow  Society  moved  beyond  this
individualized promotion to a more coordinated approach, as the next section will show.
 
The Committee of Sugar Beet Manufacturers nurses
an infant industry
38 From 1834, when members of the Moscow Agricultural Society established the Committee
of  Sugar  Beet  Manufacturers  to  1848,  when  an  excise  on  beet  sugar  solidified  the
transition  to  large  sugar  mills,  the  Committee  provided  interested  nobles  with
technological assistance, commissioners to buy sugar, and access to an extensive network
of  enterprising  landlords.  After  1848,  the  industry  had  reached  maturity  and  the
Committee lost its importance, but only after having served the function of nurturing the
infant  industry  into  adulthood.  In  1834,  two years  after  a  high tariff  on cane  sugar
increased the price of that commodity and turned enterprising landlords’ attention to
producing beet sugar, the Moscow Agricultural Society established the Committee.93 They
modeled  it  upon  the  Leipzig  convocations  of  sheep  breeders,  which  encouraged  the
exchange of advice and practical experience.94 
39 The members of the new Committee were middling and large landowners, including Malt
´sov, Bakhmetev, and others. Although the government did not provide the Committee
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with  the  10,000 rubles  a  year  subsidy  they  gave  to  the  Moscow Society’s  equivalent
committee on sheep raising, they did not attempt to hinder the society, either. Instead of
a government subsidy, the members funded it, with most giving 50 rubles a year, which
was a substantial sum. At one meeting in 1836, members donated 875 rubles; that year the
Committee raised 1 278 rubles, the majority of which they spent on their journal, with
smaller amounts going to clerical help, the dissemination of improved seeds, and lighting
the hall in which they met.95 This program of enlightenment reflects their priorities, the
first  of  which  was  their  journal,  which  they  modeled  on  that  of  the  beet  sugar
manufacturers  of  Paris.96 The  example  of  Baron Kots  showed the  importance  of  the
written word as a means to reach poorer nobles, who were not part of the more elevated
social world of most of the Committee’s members, who met in Moscow during the winter
social season. The journal of the Committee of Sugar Beet Manufacturers sought to spread
the technical and scientific practices of large growers to smaller producers as well so as to
ensure a steady supply of raw material and encourage the more frequent use of sugar
among as wide a population as possible.97 
40 In addition to  spreading practical  knowledge,  the Committee sought  to  establish the
industry on a scientific basis by studying the best soil and the best strains of sugar beets.
In  addition,  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  founding  of  the  Committee  was  that  some
producers were receiving patents for inventions that had actually been known for some
time, usually French in origin.98 The Committee sought to ensure that the best technology
would not become proprietary knowledge, which would have slowed down the growth of
the industry by raising barriers to entrance by smaller producers. 
41 The cultural status of sugar beet refining was high, partly due to the work of the MAS,
who  encouraged  nobles  to  produce  beet  sugar,  arguing  it  was  a  form  of  business
especially suitable for nobles. Here, the MAS benefited from the novelty of the sugar beet;
already  by  the  late  1820s,  it  had  become  fashionable  for  sugar  beet  factories  to  be
established on wealthy estates.99 Although most such factories were rather primitive and
had low productivity,  they suggest that nobles had a motive to engage in sugar beet
production, as it bolstered their consequence. In 1835, the MAS reported that sugar beet
was an “industry very closely tied with agriculture, which is very proper for landlords
who do not wish to go into trade.”100 In addition, the MAS argued that the sugar beet
industry “should predominantly belong to the noble class, as they have the land and labor
to produce the raw material.”101
42 The stated focus of the Committee was practical: to avoid mistakes and to share advice.102
They helped beet sugar producers, especially smaller ones, by establishing several agents
to sell seeds. Between 1831 and 1846, the Committee’s agents sold 2,574,563 silver rubles’
worth of  sugar from the committee members.103 In addition,  detailed plans and even
models of the necessary equipment made establishing a sugar mill more possible for a
larger  number  of  landlords.104 The  Committee  even  built  a  model  sugar  factory in
Moscow, which soon had to close due to not being profitable.105 In 1839, the Committee
petitioned to open a refinery in Moscow so that the half‑processed granules of nearby
estates  could  be  turned into  the  more  refined and expensive  white  sugar.  Tellingly,
however, when a refinery was built, it was in Kiev in 1843, showing the shift from the
Moscow to the Ukrainian provinces.106
43 The profitability of sugar beet and the difficulties of using serf labor in such advanced
mechanized factories made many enterprising landlords aware of the limits of serfdom
when combined  with  more  advanced  agriculture.  This  was  also  clear  in  the  lack  of
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qualified skilled personnel. When serfs were sent to become technicians and returned as
basically the director of the factory, as had happened with Baron Kots’ serf, it required
literacy and an ability to command that sat uneasily with serfdom. In 1834, Aleksandr
Dmitrievich Chertkov, who was a historian and archeologist whose library dealing with
Russian  history  later  served  as  one  of  the  fundamental  collections  of  the  Historical
Museum in Moscow, as well as a member of the Moscow Society and the Committee,
opened a sugar mill in Voronezh. Chertkov believed that the production of sugar beet had
a positive effect on the intellectual development of serfs and established a school for
them. One of his serfs, Egor Mikhailovich Chekhov, worked as a clerk in the mill and was
given its byproducts, which he used to feed his livestock. He began to trade in livestock
for himself and for his master and in 1841 he bought out himself and his family.107 His
grandson, the writer Anton Pavlovich Chekhov, was born into freedom in 1860.
44 In 1848, the new excise on beet sugar was a turning point in the industry, confirming that
the center of production had shifted to the Ukrainian provinces and that free labor was
dominant  there.  Right‑bank  Ukraine,  and  particularly  the  area  around Kiev,  was  an
emerging center of beet sugar production, with large, technologically advanced factories
that could be much more efficient in the amount of sugar produced from each beet. The
smaller, less advanced factories that the MAS had done so much to encourage found it
difficult to absorb the cost of the excise, and many went out of business. These sugar
factories in Ukraine also underwent a shift to the use of free labor during this time, as the
excise coincided with the imposition of inventories in right‑bank Ukraine in 1847‑1848;
these inventories specified in great detail what services serfs owed their masters. The
government sought to punish the landlords in the area,  many of  whom were Polish,
through these inventories.108 As a result of the inventories and the excise, the large sugar
factories in the region used free labor almost exclusively by the end of the 1840s.109
45 Some of the largest and most advanced sugar beet factories belonged to Count Aleksei
Alekseevich  Bobrinskii.  By  1860‑1861,  his  factories  in  Tula  and Kiev  provinces  alone
produced more than 9,027,500 pounds (4 514 tons) of sugar as well as having an associated
coal mine to provide fuel for the machines.110 In his Studies on the Interior of Russia,
based on an 1843 trip to Russia, August von Haxthausen described Bobrinskii’s factory in
Tula. Haxthausen was shown the factory by its manager, a German school friend of his,
and he described it as a plant filled with modern inventions and producing sugar that he
found to be just as good as that made from cane.111 The plant used hired labor and paid
peasant women for beets. At the 1846 meeting of the Committee, MAS Secretary Maslov
gave the first description of Bobrinskii’s massive factory in Kiev, which had a sugar beet
farm fifteen  times  the  size  of  the  largest  amount  of  land devoted  to  growing  them
elsewhere. The land had 3 500 serfs working on it, and the factory included the use of free
labor,  with a payroll  of 60,000 paper rubles.112 The use of free labor in the Ukrainian
provinces would only accelerate with the introduction of the inventories and the excise. 
46 Sugar beet grows best in soils that have a mixture of sand and clay, and the areas in
Ukraine that became centers of its production there are rich in such soils. There is a
smaller area of suitable soil surrounding Kiev, but the largest area of this soil is found
near Kherson, which produced the second largest crop in the region by 1901, after Baku.
113 There were smaller areas of such soil in European Russia, but nowhere was there such
a wide expanse as in southern Ukraine.114
47 In addition to a higher use of free labor, the factories in central and southern Ukraine
were more technologically advanced compared to those in central Russia. This can be
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seen  in  the  more  widespread  use  of  steam‑driven  technology  in  the  sugar  mills  in
Ukraine.  Wood‑fired beet  sugar  mills tended  to be  smaller,  estate‑based  factories  like
those encouraged by the MAS. In contrast,  in Ukraine, in 1848, 36 of 184 factories,  or
20 percent, used steam. In central Russia, only 40 of 297 mills, or 13 percent, used steam.
115 This difference, although not huge numerically, was very important at the moment
when  the  excise  was  introduced,  which  rewarded  more  technologically  advanced
factories.  The  percentage  of  wood‑burning  factories  in  Ukraine  fell  from  80  to  just
60 percent of the total from 1848 to 1857‑58, while in central Russia it only fell from 87 to
70 percent over the same period.116 Steam‑powered factories were making greater inroads
into Ukrainian factories than into ones in Central Russia.
48 This shift from central Russia to Ukraine and from smaller factories to large ones meant
that the Committee lost its importance. The creation of a beet sugar refinery in Kiev in
1843, rather than in Moscow as the Committee had hoped, accelerated the shift to the
Ukrainian provinces, as it was much easier to sell refined beet sugar than granules, which
were a middle‑stage product.117 The Committee began to die out in the second half of the
1840s.118 Although the Committee continued to meet and there was a special discussion
about  the  excise  in  1848,  such  meetings  became  increasingly  sporadic.  In  1854,  the
twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Committee was observed, but this did not
lead  to  its  revitalization.  By  1860,  no  mention  of  the  Committee  was  made  in  the
publications of the Moscow Society.119 Large factories no longer needed the tutelage of
the Committee, and smaller factories often had had to close.120 
49 The  Southern  Russian  Agricultural  Society,  founded  in  Odessa  in  1828  and  the  only
agricultural society in the pre‑reform Ukrainian provinces, did not take a leading role in
encouraging the beet sugar industry. It published only two articles on beet sugar before
1861.121 A report covering their first 25 years of activity noted that sugar beet factories
were spreading in Kiev and elsewhere and that some were connected to coal mines, which
provided the fuel. The report congratulated the factory owners and stated that the Odessa
society had been in contact with the Committee of the Moscow Society to distribute seeds
and literature through the region, but did not note any independent action of the Odessa
society.122 This lack of zeal can perhaps be explained by the rampant smuggling of refined
sugar through Odessa. According to Russian laws, refined sugar could only be imported to
Odessa as well as the Black Sea ports of the Caucasus. This measure was instituted in
order to encourage the use of the ports, and it strictly forbade the distribution of sugar to
the interior. However, the amount of refined sugar brought to Odessa increased fourfold
between 1827 and 1846, and the amount was so large that it was impossible that it was all
being consumed within that town.123 This may have made it difficult for all members of
the  Odessa  society  to  agree  that  encouraging  the  production  of  beet  sugar  was
worthwhile.
50 By the  late  nineteenth century,  owners  of  large  beet  sugar  mills  were  interested in
voluntary associations to help them with their concerns, but those concerns had changed.
Very large beet sugar mills produced mammoth amounts of sugar. The Mikhailov factory
of Baron Tereshchenko in Chernigov province in Left‑bank Ukraine alone produced an
average of 75,837,790 pounds of beet sugar, equivalent to 37,918 tons, every year between
1907 and 1913, according to statistics kept by the Ministry of Transportation.124 Railroads
enabled the transportation of such massive quantities throughout the empire.125 In 1897,
the All‑Russian Society of Sugar Beet Producers was founded in Kiev. It was a specialized,
scientific society that focused on studying the most productive strains of sugar beets, and
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they established experimental fields in private estates to do so in 1901, and a central
experimental station in 1912.126 The broad‑based propaganda of the Moscow Society no
longer fit the more technical concerns of these sugar beet magnates. This also suggests
the degree to which the sugar beet industry helped to stimulate science and industry in
Ukraine. Bobrinskii’s factory in Kiev helped to stimulate the development of a machine
building industry in Ukraine, for example.127
 
Conclusion
51 The Moscow Agricultural Society played a crucial role in nurturing the infant industry of
beet sugar production. It fed the infant industry by providing technical information on
how to build factories and grow sugar beets,  commissioners to sell  the product,  and
access to a social network of many leading entrepreneurial landlords. This allowed a large
number of nobles with smaller landholdings and fewer serfs to enter the market, which
did indeed increase the base of raw materials and consumption of sugar, just as the MAS
had hoped. 
52 However,  when  the  infant  industry  reached  adulthood,  the  services  of  the  Moscow
Society were no longer needed. Large factory owners did not need assistance with seeds
or sales, but were able to compete with cane sugar in the large domestic market, as well
as in Asia.  The Ukrainian beet sugar industry was particularly well  positioned in the
market, since it already had shifted to free labor before the end of serfdom and was using
advanced equipment such as steam‑driven machines. After 1861, sugar beet production
exploded, from 70,414 tons in 1860‑1861128 to 777,129 tons in 1897, accounting for fifteen
percent of the world’s production of sugar beet.129 An average of 645,300 acres were sown
in sugar beets over 1886 to 1895 and 1,425,805 acres (2227.8 square miles) were sown in
1901.130 In 1917, Russia produced 1,120,878 tons of sugar, more than any other country,
aside from Germany.131 Most of the sugar was consumed at home, although some was
exported to Asia.  This was despite a precipitous drop in world sugar prices over the
second half  of  the nineteenth century.  Thus,  Russian sugar production was a success
because  they  were  able  to  provide  a  product  of  a  relatively  consistent  quality  at  a
competitive price.
53 This  article  has  shown  that  the  Moscow  Agricultural  Society  played  an  important,
although transitory, role in the introduction of an industry into the Russian Empire that
would prove to be an enduring success in the market. The sugar beet industry also was
connected to the growth of free labor and industrialization in Ukraine, even before the
abolition of serfdom, which helps to explain the divergent paths of Russia and Ukraine.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, beet sugar moved from being a curiosity to
becoming a force for change.
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ABSTRACTS
This article explores how agricultural societies, which were voluntary associations dedicated to
improving agriculture, worked with the state and agriculturalists to foster the growth of a new
sugar beet industry during the nineteenth century. Using the Moscow Agricultural Society (est.
1818)  as  the  focal  point,  it  argues  that  although  the  Society  was  successful  in  changing
agricultural  practices  and  spreading  the  cultivation  of  sugar  beets  even  before  the  end  of
serfdom in 1861, the end result was not what the Society had expected. While they had originally
envisioned a  European Russia  dotted with  small  producers  growing sugar  beet  processed by
larger  landowners,  what  resulted  was  the  rise  of  massive  vertically  integrated  beet  sugar
production in central and southern Ukraine, which had more suitable soil and wider use of free
labor. It thus shows the power of experts to change the environment and the limits of that power
.
Cet article étudie comment,  au XIXe siècle,  des sociétés agricoles,  qui étaient des associations
bénévoles  engagées  dans  l’amélioration  de  l’agriculture,  travaillèrent  avec  l’État  et  les
agriculteurs à favoriser l’expansion d’une nouvelle industrie de la betterave sucrière. Prenant la
Société agricole de Moscou (fondée en 1818) comme point focal, il démontre que celle-ci, bien
qu’elle eût réussi à changer les pratiques et à étendre la culture de la betterave sucrière avant
même l’abolition du servage en 1861, n’avait pas obtenu le résultat escompté. Alors que la Société
agricole  de  Moscou  avait  initialement  imaginé  une  Russie  européenne  dotée  de  petits
producteurs  éparpillés  cultivant  de  la  betterave  qui  aurait  été  transformée  par  de  grands
propriétaires  fonciers,  elle  constata  l’augmentation  d’une production  de  masse  à  intégration
verticale en Ukraine centrale et méridionale, dont la qualité des terres était plus adaptée à cette
culture et qui disposait plus largement d’une main d’œuvre gratuite. L’article démontre ainsi le
pouvoir des experts, et ses limites, à changer l’environnement.
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